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What contribution do universities make 
to innovation, productivity and long-run
economic growth? At the core of 
their activities are two ‘products’: 
scientific research and graduates. And 
as is made clear in the government-
commissioned review of the UK's science
and innovation system, led by Lord Sainsbury
and published in early October alongside 
the comprehensive spending review, 
both of these outputs are essential for
sustaining and improving the nation’s
economic performance.
This issue of CentrePiece explores some of
the central policy concerns facing institutions
of higher education and their political
masters. Nick Butler makes the case for
universities to have greater independence
and resources. Stephen Machin and Sandra
McNally note shortages of graduates in key
subjects, notably science, engineering and
technology. And Mark Schankerman raises
questions about the institutional framework
for scientific endeavour and the
commercialisation of new inventions
through licensing to the private sector – 
so-called ‘knowledge transfer’. 
Knowledge transfer has been central to the
work of the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) since its inception –
though the long track record of CEP
influence is more evident in the world of
public policy. Stephen Nickell’s account here
of his time on the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee demonstrates
this wider social impact of economic
research, in terms of the transfer of both
people and ideas.
Perhaps less well known is the Centre’s
involvement in knowledge transfer to the
private sector. Business-supported research
initiatives include the Manpower Human
Resources Laboratory and a programme on
new technology and productivity sponsored
by EDS. And last year, CEP collaborated
with McKinsey & Company on a second
survey of management practices covering
thousands of firms in Europe, Asia and the
United States, the first results of which are
summarised here.
CEP’s research on and with the private
sector tends to have a long-run focus
through the generation of ideas and new
policies, such as changes in competition
policy stimulated by Stephen Nickell’s 
work in the mid-1990s. One recent
example is a study of regulation of 
Europe’s mobile phone industry described in
this CentrePiece.
Research reported in the previous issue
examines the European Commission’s
recently concluded case against Microsoft.
The court ruling that the software giant
had abused its monopoly power – and the
careful use of economic arguments in
support of this view – is an example of the
effects that the output of universities can
have on innovation, particularly in the high-
tech industries that the Sainsbury review is
keen to promote.
As always, your feedback on CentrePiece
is welcome. And do pass the magazine
onto colleagues – whether they’re in a
university or making use of the core
products of universities.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@compuserve.com
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Universities are a key source of the new
scientific knowledge that drives long-run
economic growth. But what are the incentives
for scientists to generate commercially valuable
inventions and for university managers to
license such technologies to the private sector?
Research by Mark Schankerman and
colleagues investigates.
Harnessing 
success:
incentives for invention 
and technology 
transfer in universities
P
erhaps the greatest long-
term productivity advances
come through
breakthroughs in basic
knowledge – and a
substantial proportion of the research and
development (R&D) that creates new
knowledge and leads to increased
productivity is done in universities.
University research not only raises the
productivity of private sector R&D (through
‘knowledge spillovers’) and encourages
more of it to be done; it also leads to
inventions that can be commercialised,
either through licensing to private firms or
via the formation of new start-up
companies.
Such ‘technology transfer’ by
universities has grown dramatically in the
past two decades, particularly in the United
States. Between 1991 and 2004, the
number of US university patent
applications rose from 1,584 to 10,517,
and licensing income increased from $218
million to $1.4 billion (which is 6% of
federal R&D financing for universities).
European and Asian universities are less
involved in this form of technology transfer
but are rapidly expanding their activities. 
The rapid growth of technology
transfer in the United States is in part due
to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. This piece of
legislation not only gave universities the
right to patent new discoveries but also
mandated them to license inventions made
with federally sponsored research to the
private sector. Now, nearly all US research
universities have a technology licensing
office and explicit intellectual property
policies and royalty-sharing arrangements
for their scientists.
Analysing technology
transfer
In essence, technology transfer involves
two distinct activities: innovation by
university scientists and commercialisation
by the university’s technology licensing
office (see Figure 1). In the first stage,
scientists produce both publications and
inventions. The mix of these two may be
influenced by the incentive of money, Im
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either for themselves directly or as
enhanced funding for their research
laboratories. Other incentives – such as
promotion and tenure rules, and intrinsic
motivation to do basic and applied
research – are also likely to play a role. 
The second stage is the
commercialisation of inventions by the
technology licensing office, which decides
whether to patent and license inventions,
identifies licensees and structures
contracts. The effectiveness of the
technology licensing office is likely to be
influenced by the university's objectives,
government constraints on licensing and
incentives given to its managers.
Our research programme is studying
the role of incentives and other
institutional features that can make the
process of technology transfer more
effective. Given the importance of
research for long-term growth, it is critical
to understand what drives scientific
endeavour and technology licensing
activity.
Is research a purely intellectual pursuit
driven by intrinsic motivation, or do
economic incentives play a role in the way
that scientists structure their work? What
are the most appropriate incentives for
managers in technology licensing offices?
And how is technology transfer
performance influenced by whether a
university is private or public (and hence
constrained by government objectives) and
the degree to which it chooses, or is
obliged, to promote local and regional
development? Our research programme
explores all of these questions.
Royalty incentives for
scientists 
In a study with Saul Lach, I use US data (as
similar data are not yet available in
Europe) to examine how the share of
licensing royalties from university
inventions received by academic inventors
(their ‘cash flow rights’) affects the
number and licensing value of inventions
in universities.
Our central finding is that incentives
are effective: universities that give greater
royalty incentives do much better in terms
of licensing income from technology
transfer. This works both by inducing
greater effort by researchers and through
‘sorting’ of the most productive and
entrepreneurial scientists into high-royalty
universities. We also find that royalty
incentives have a much larger impact in
private universities than in public ones,
and technology licensing activity is more
commercially effective in the former.
In the United States, universities
usually claim exclusive ownership (‘control
rights’) over inventions made by their
scientists. But the cash flow rights from
licensing inventions are typically shared
between the inventor and various parts of
the university according to specified
royalty-sharing schedules. There is
substantial variation in these arrangements
across US research universities, which
makes it possible to estimate their effect
on inventive output.
Our study focuses on two outcomes –
licensing income and the number of
inventions disclosed by faculty scientists to
technology licensing offices – using data
from the Association of University
Technology Managers, combined with
information on the distribution of royalty
shares for 102 US universities during the
period 1991-99.
The novel aspect of the data is the
information on the distribution of licensing
income between the university and the
inventor(s). The inventor retains a given
percentage of net licensing income and
the rest is allocated to the inventor's
laboratory, department and college and to
the university. Our criterion for identifying
the inventor’s share is that the inventor
must gain either cash flow rights or must
have direct control rights over the income
(for example, lab research money).
In about half the universities, these
royalty shares vary with the level of
licensing income generated by an invention
(‘non-linear royalty schedules’). The
average inventor's share is 41% among
the 58 universities using linear royalty
schedules, but there is substantial variation:
the minimum inventor royalty share is 25%
and the maximum 65%. The royalty shares
in the 44 universities with non-linear
schedules display even larger variability: the
average royalty share is 51%, but the
minimum is 20% and the maximum 97%.
CentrePiece Autumn 2007
3
University 
scientists
University 
technology
licensing 
office
‘Knowledge spillovers’
Corporate research funding
‘Market for technology’
Licensed inventions
Start-up companies
Venture
capital
Figure 1:
University-private sector science links
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and potential
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Another striking feature is that in
every university, inventor royalty shares are
either constant or decline with the level of
licensing income per invention. On
average, they start at 54% and decline to
30% for inventions generating over 
$1 million. Royalty shares are also
unrelated to various characteristics of the
universities, such as faculty size, academic
quality and the number of technology
licensing office professionals per faculty. 
Among the more detailed findings of
our research:
■ Academic research and inventive activity
in universities respond to variations in
inventors' royalty shares. Controlling for
a variety of factors – including university
size, quality and R&D funding –
universities with higher royalty shares
generate higher levels of licensing
income. This finding is important
because it implies that the design of
intellectual property rights and other
forms of incentives in academic
institutions can have real effects.
■ Inventors respond both to cash royalty
share and to royalties used to support
their research labs (when the scientists
have direct control over their use). Thus,
both high-powered monetary incentives
and intrinsic motivation seem to play a
role. This is relevant to the design of
university royalty-sharing arrangements.
For example, non-science faculty may
view generous payments to support
research labs as less objectionable than
direct cash payments to the scientists.
■ The incentive effects of royalty-sharing
work both by inducing greater effort by
scientists and through sorting of
scientists across universities so that the
most productive and entrepreneurial
scientists tend to work in higher royalty
universities.
■ The response to incentives is much
larger in private universities than in
public ones. If universities do not expect
a strategic reaction from their
competitors, the research indicates that
in most private universities, and in about
half the public ones, the incentive effect
is strong enough to produce a ‘Laffer
effect’, where raising the inventor's
royalty share actually increases the
license revenue retained by the university
(net of payments to inventors).
■ But when universities expect competing
universities to match changes in their
royalty share, the benefits to the
universities of raising inventors’ royalty
shares will be smaller. Thus, high-
powered, invention-based incentives are
important, but so too is the strategic
behaviour among universities in setting
these incentives. 
■ Technology licensing offices are more
productive in private universities,
suggesting that private institutions have
more effective, commercially-oriented
technology transfer activity.
Incentives for technology
licensing offices
Why might university ownership affect
technology transfer performance? In a
study with Sharon Belenzon, I combine
evidence from surveys of US universities’
technology licensing offices with panel
data on licensing performance to address
this question.
Whereas previous research has shown
that technology transfer performance is
influenced by university characteristics and
other factors, including university
ownership (public versus private),
academic quality, local (high-tech) demand
conditions and licensing contract design,
our study focuses more on the `black box'
of productivity within the technology
licensing office. We examine three key
determinants of technology licensing
productivity – performance pay; local
development objectives; and government
constraints on licensing activity –
combining new survey data with panel
data from public sources on 86 US
universities for the period 1995-99.
The survey data show that universities’
two main objectives are generating
licensing income and promoting local and
regional development, the latter goal
being more prominent in public
universities. Institutions that view local
economic development as one of their
primary functions might perform
differently from those that exclusively
pursue income maximisation.
Public universities are also more
affected by the imposition by state
governments of a variety of constraints –
both statutory restrictions and informal
political pressure – on their licensing
activity. Our study quantifies the impact of
incentives and measures the implicit cost
of these constraints and of concentrating
on local development objectives by
estimating forgone licensing income.
We find that technology licensing
offices in private universities are much
more likely to adopt incentive pay for
their staff than those in public
institutions. But ownership does not
affect the licensing performance of the
technology licensing office once the use
of incentive pay is controlled for. From a
policy perspective, this means that it
might be possible to get ‘private
performance’ from public institutions if
the right incentives are introduced.
These incentives certainly matter: we
find that technology transfer performance
is strongly influenced by whether a
technology licensing office uses
performance-based pay for their staff.
We also find that technology transfer
performance is affected by the extent to
which there is a preference for developing
licensing activity locally rather than more
widely, and by formal and informal
constraints imposed by government.
Universities with a stronger local
development focus earn far less licensing
income from a given pool of inventions.
This raises important policy questions
about the right balance between income
maximisation and local development focus
in technology licensing activity. 
Among the more detailed findings of
our research:
■ Compared with technology licensing
offices in public universities, those in
private universities are significantly more
likely to use performance-based pay.
Among the private universities surveyed,
79% use some form of incentive pay as
compared with only half of the public
universities.
■ Performance pay has strong incentive
The incentive
effect of
royalty-
sharing for
scientists is
much larger
in private
universities
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This article draws on research reported in
‘Incentives and Invention in Universities’ 
by Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 729
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0729.pdf) and ‘The Impact of Private
Ownership, Incentives and Local
Development Objectives on University
Technology Transfer Performance’ by Sharon
Belenzon and Mark Schankerman, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 779 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0779.pdf).
Mark Schankerman is professor of
economics at LSE and director of CEP’s
research programme on productivity and
innovation. Saul Lach is professor of
economics at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. Sharon Belenzon, a CEP research
associate, is a postdoctoral research fellow at
Nuffield College, Oxford.
effects. Universities that use bonus pay
generate, on average, about 30-40%
more income per license, after
controlling for other factors.
■ While private ownership has a large,
positive effect on the adoption of
incentive pay, ownership has no
independent effect on licensing
performance, once we have controlled
for whether the university has adopted
incentive pay.
■ Private universities are much less
constrained in their freedom of
operation by state laws and regulations,
and are more likely to be focused on
generating licensing income compared
with more ‘social’ objectives such as
promoting local and regional
development. 
■ Local and regional development
objectives are ‘costly' in terms of
forgone license income. Universities
with strong objectives of this kind
generate, on average, about 30% less
income per license, after controlling for
other factors. State government
constraints also reduce license income.
The finding that local development
objectives are costly in terms of the
forgone license income raises an
important policy question. There are two
economic arguments for having a
preference for local licensing. First, pure
knowledge spillovers have a tendency to
be geographically localised. Second, the
new economic geography literature
emphasises that growth can be stimulated
by agglomeration effects working through
various supply and demand linkages.
But by showing that there is an
opportunity cost of promoting local
development in this way, our research
highlights the importance of comparing
this approach with an alternative policy of
maximising income from university
inventions (with no preference for local
development) and using the additional
license income generated to finance local
economic development in other ways – for
example, through lower business taxes or
direct subsidy programmes.
Conclusions
Many countries, in Europe and beyond,
are increasingly concerned about how to
promote more effective technology
transfer and other forms of research
collaboration between universities (and
other public research organisations) and
the private sector. Clear ownership rights,
incentives and a clear definition of the
objectives of technology transfer are key
elements of that process.
Our research makes a contribution to
that public debate by showing that the
benefits to universities are strongly
affected by how incentives are set and by
identifying characteristics of technology
licensing offices that influence the
effectiveness of royalty incentives.
One caveat applies to all this work.
Our findings contribute to the policy
debate about the effectiveness of
university licensing activity, but they are
not a cost-benefit analysis of the
'commercialisation' of universities. Many
scholars have expressed concerns about
the potential costs of these developments,
including the threat to established norms
of ‘open science’ and the potential
redirection of research away from
fundamental science. While there is only
limited evidence of such costs thus far,
continuing vigilance is needed to ensure
that they do not get out of hand.
Important challenges for research and
policy remain:
■ How should the ‘market for technology
licensing’ best be structured, and what
role, if any, should government have in
that process?
■ Should universities have monopoly
control over the inventions of their
scientists, as they currently do, or
should the scientists be free to market
their inventions through other
channels?
■ Should the use of market-based patent
and licensing intermediaries be allowed
(while preserving the sharing of cash
flow rights between the scientist and
the university)? 
■ How much geographic specialisation
should there be (for example, should
universities join into regional technology
transfer offices, as in some countries
like Germany?) and should such offices
specialise in particular scientific
disciplines?
■ In short, how should the market in
technology transfer be structured to
exploit most effectively the economies
of scale and informational advantages
in these activities? 
Universities with a stronger
local development focus earn
much less licensing income
Royalty incentives for
scientists need to be
combined with
performance incentives
within technology
licensing offices
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Higher 
education
and the labour market
I
n recent decades, there has
been rapid expansion of higher
(‘tertiary-level’) education
across many countries. This has
had important and profound
effects on labour markets and
the way in which employers use highly
educated labour.
These expansions have, for the most
part, been predicated on the assumption
that more education is good for individuals
and for society as a whole, not only in
terms of economic outcomes like wages or
employment, but also for a wide range of
social outcomes like improved health,
reduced crime and higher well-being. 
But along with expansion of the
system has come a range of new
questions that have emerged as a
consequence of there being many more
graduates. Is there now ‘over-supply’ of
graduates? Is there evidence of ‘over-
qualification’ and skill mismatch? 
Are students studying the ‘right type’ of
subjects? And is there a shortage 
of science and technology graduates 
in particular?
In a recent report, we review the
evidence on these questions. The report
offers some conclusions about the way in
which the expansion of higher education
has had important effects on economic
outcomes – and draws policy implications
for the future.
The increasing supply 
of graduates
The labour market consequences of
increasing supply can be considered within
a simple demand and supply framework.
Starting from a position where the
demand for and supply of graduates are in
balance, a boost in the supply of
graduates should, other things being
equal, lead to a reduction in the wage
premium because employers have a wider
range of similarly qualified people to
choose from. But if, for whatever reason,
employers demand more graduates, then
the wage premium may not fall. 
The wage premium depends on the
interaction of demand and supply. In
recent decades, there has been a big
increase in both the demand for and
supply of graduates. It is the fact that
demand has outstripped supply that has
given rise to an increasing wage premium
for a university degree. There is 
much controversy about the reasons 
for increasing demand for graduates, 
but the predominant view is that ‘skill-
biased technological change’ is a major
contributory factor.
In most countries, there has been
continued expansion of higher education
in the last decade. But the wage premium
attached to higher education has increased
in most of them. The exceptions are Spain
and New Zealand – two countries with
particularly large expansion of higher
education in the last 10 years – and Korea,
where the wage premium declined
markedly between 1974 and 1990, a
period of industrialisation when there was
massive growth in higher education.
But even in these three countries,
there is still a positive return to higher
education. Thus, it makes little sense to
speak of ‘over-supply’ of higher education.
The strong, positive and (often) increasing
return to higher education suggests that
‘under-supply’ is more of an issue and that
continued expansion is justified. In terms
of employability, in many countries, there
has been some catch-up of less educated
groups over the last decade, but graduates
continue to have a much higher
probability of being in a job.
Mismatches and shortages
Nevertheless, it sometimes takes a long
time for some (usually less well
performing) graduates to find jobs after
leaving higher education and even then,
some are not in jobs that appear to be
well matched to their qualifications. At the
same time, there are shortages in certain
sectors: this is evident in employer surveys
and in some data analysis that shows a
negative wage premium associated with
‘skill mismatch’.
A body of research has attempted to
measure these outcomes, and the
(sometimes misused) terms of ‘over-
education’ and ‘under-education’ have
emerged: the former arises if an individual
holds higher qualifications than required
by his or her job whereas the opposite
applies for the ‘under-educated’. But
statistics on over- and under-education are
difficult to interpret as workers are
matched to jobs based on a range of
characteristics and not just their education
Higher education around the world has expanded rapidly in recent years,
yet graduates continue to command a wage premium in the labour
market. So, as Stephen Machin and Sandra McNally show, there are no
problems of ‘over-supply’ or ‘over-qualification’ – rather there are
‘shortages’ in some fields, which further expansion could alleviate.
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Concerns about the 
‘over-supply’ and/or 
‘over-qualification’ of
graduates are misplacedImag
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level. What’s more, apparent mismatch
may be a temporary phenomenon.
The extent to which such problems are
seen as temporary varies across studies
and countries. But one generalisation that
can be made is that the fact of observing
‘over-qualified’ individuals in the
workforce does not mean that there is
over-supply of graduates. If there were
over-supply, relative wages and
employment probabilities would fall to the
level of their closest substitutes – and this
has not happened. 
The indications are that skill mismatch
(or inadequate levels of skill) is more of a
problem than over-qualification. In some
countries, there is a need to improve the
content and accreditation of vocational
qualifications so that they provide what
employers need and are recognised to 
do so.
This is not to say that higher education
should be geared to providing highly
specific skills that are currently needed by
employers. Some studies suggest that
general education and skills are more
valuable because they enable workers to
respond to shocks to the economy (for
example, those that require sectoral
change) and advances in technology.
Degree subjects
One hypothesis put forward to explain skill
shortages is that individuals are not
choosing the right type of graduate
studies (whether this education is
general/academic or vocational). In other
words, the choice of higher education
made by individuals does not correspond
to the needs of the labour market in terms
of field of study.
As yet, there are relatively few studies
that estimate returns to higher education
by subject of degree – especially when we
are most interested in change over time.
One study looks at changes in returns to
subject of degree over time in Britain,
Germany, France and the United States,
and finds that a return to an arts degree
had the lowest relative return within 
all countries, for two time periods (the
early 1990s and 2000) and for both men
and women.
In contrast, the returns to degrees in
science, engineering and technology are
substantial (especially for men). Such
findings are broadly consistent with what
is found for a number of other countries –
science/engineering/technology is often
among the category of subjects with a
relatively high return (along with some
social science subjects and professions
such as law and medicine) whereas 
arts and humanities are often among 
the category of subjects with a relatively
low return.
So it may be relevant to talk of
graduate over-supply in relation to some
subjects of degree. For example, there
have been estimates to suggest that the
wage return to an arts and humanities
degree is zero in Britain. 
This raises the question as to why
people continue to pursue such
qualifications. There are various possible
explanations: one is that wages do not
capture important aspects of the ‘value’ of
the degree for individuals – for example,
higher education has a ‘consumption’
value as well as a value in the labour
market; and jobs have non-pecuniary
aspects that make them attractive to
individuals. Second, students may not be
well enough informed about the likely
returns to subject of degree.
The value of science degrees
The existence of the relatively high wage
differential for science/engineering/
technology compared with other subjects
illustrates the high value placed on the
field by employers and indicates high
relative demand for graduates with 
this field of study. This might be
interpreted as a ‘shortage’ of science and
technology graduates and would be
consistent with some reports of
‘shortages’ that have appeared in several
countries, including Australia, Belgium,
Britain and New Zealand.
There are big differences between
countries in the proportion of graduates
who qualify with a degree in science and
technology. Comparing across continents
(using data from 2000), Asia has the
highest percentage of graduates with
science and technology degrees (32%),
which is just above Europe (28%) and
considerably above North America (18%),
South America (22%) and Oceania (22%).
Within Asia, China has a particularly
large share of graduates with a degree in
science and technology (53%). Even
though the EU has a better performance
than the United States in terms of
producing science and engineering
graduates, it lags well behind the United
States in terms of the proportion of
science and technology researchers in the
labour market. Nevertheless, as in other
countries, there are claims of a ‘shortage’
in the United States, which economists
have struggled to reconcile with the facts
(which belie this concern).
Further analysis suggests that 
the underlying issue is that the United
States maintains an adequate supply of
scientists and engineers only because of
the sizeable influx of foreign-born
students and employees. This could be a
risk to US research if there is any
interruption of the flow of immigrant
scientists and engineers.
The ‘brain drain’ to the United States
is also a concern for other countries. For
example, analysis of migration flows in
Just because there are
over-qualified individuals
in the workforce does 
not mean that there is
over-supply of graduates
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and out of Europe suggests that Europe
has lost out in terms of its own potential
supply of ‘domestic’ graduates and its
ability to attract scientists and engineers
from other countries. The shortage of
personnel in these areas is likely to have
costs in terms of innovation and
consequent productivity growth.
Conclusions and policy
implications
While concerns about over-education are
largely misplaced, there do appear to be
problems with graduates not always
having the skills required by employers.
One response to this is to make sure that
vocational courses meet the requirements
of employers and to ensure that the
accreditation system is appropriate.
But it would be unwise to emphasise
acquisition of highly specific skills at the
expense of general education. This is a
challenge for whole educational structures
not just higher education since, in many
countries, students have to make a
decision between general and vocational
education long before they reach the
stage of entering higher education. 
There is also a question of the balance
between employer-provided training and
education provided by institutions of
higher education. Employers have a role
in addressing concerns about skill
mismatch. And governments have an
important role in improving information
about training opportunities, setting
appropriate legal frameworks and
ensuring portability of skills.
Potential policy responses to the
variation in returns to higher education by
subject include differential fees (or
bursaries) by degree subject so that
graduates are encouraged to study
subjects for which there is high relative
demand in the labour market. There may
also be a case for the provision of better
information to potential students on job
prospects and earnings by degree subject.
More generally, given the positive
relationship between education and
economic growth, and the fact that
returns to higher education are strongly
positive, there is a good argument for
continuing to expand higher education.
This could be achieved by public
provision of more places in higher
education. Where capacity constraints
are not the issue, then an important
matter for investigation is why more
young people do not pursue higher
education. One possibility is the cost
both in terms of fees and the
opportunity cost (the earnings students –
and possibly their families – must forgo
while in higher education). Where such
constraints exist (most likely for students
from poor social backgrounds), there is a
good case for bursaries.
Another possibility is that there is
insufficient information available to
potential students about the returns that
might be gained from pursuing higher
education (or returns in certain subject
areas). In this case again, the appropriate
policy response would be to provide this
information at appropriate stages of an
individual’s education.
The article summarises ‘Tertiary Education
Systems and Labour Markets’ by Stephen
Machin and Sandra McNally, a report
prepared for the OECD.
The full report is available here:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/31/
38006954.pdf
Stephen Machin is CEP’s research director
and director of the Centre for the Economics
of Education (CEE). Sandra McNally is
director of CEP’s research programme on
education and skills.
In many countries, there
is relatively higher
demand for graduates 
in science, engineering
and technology
Skill mismatch – or
inadequate levels
of skill – is more of
a problem than
over-qualification
With a few honourable exceptions, the universities of
Europe are failing to provide the intellectual and creative
energy that is required to improve the continent's
relatively poor economic performance. Too few of them
are world-class centres of research and teaching
excellence. Many are desperately short of resources. Some
are shamefully poor in every sense and can barely provide
what most objective observers would understand to be an
education of quality.
The picture is not uniformly bleak. The UK and some of
the Nordic countries have increased funding in recent
years. Countries such as Austria, Denmark and the
Netherlands have greatly improved the way their
universities are run. The UK has some of the best research
universities in the world, thanks in good measure to the
relative autonomy of its institutions and to the way that
research funding is allocated – on the basis of peer-
reviewed excellence as opposed to the whims of central
government or the need to spread limited resources
evenly across every region.
But European institutions are not well placed to compete
in what has become a global competition for talent. In
countries such as France, Germany and Italy, the sector is
struggling to cope with too many students, and delivering
uninspiring teaching in dilapidated buildings. Across
Europe as a whole, higher education is crying out for
reform in six important areas.
The first concerns control and independence. Universities
need the autonomy necessary to manage their own affairs
in an efficient fashion. Universities that are effectively
agencies of the state – as is in effect the case in France
and Italy – have very little control over their resources and
are unable to set relevant academic priorities.
Throughout Europe, including the UK, there is a 
powerful case for universities to be more independent –
even if government remains the main purchaser of
services – including both teaching and research. This is
not about ‘privatisation’ in the sense of institutions 
being sold to the highest bidder. It is rather about
universities seeking and earning the freedom necessary to
transform what one observer has called the last major
nationalised industry.
Second, higher education needs to be properly funded.
The European Union (EU) countries currently invest about
1.2% of their GDP in this area. A figure nearer to 2%
would be required to make the EU an effective
competitor with the best in the world.
The important difference between Europe and just about
every other developed economy is that private finance
plays a very modest role in its university funding. Thus,
public funding for higher education represents about 1%
of GDP for the EU countries, roughly the same
proportion as in the United States. But private funding
for US universities amounts to a further 1.4% of GDP
and the average in OECD countries is 0.8%, compared
with only 0.1% for Europe.
If the quality is to be maintained and improved, and
Europe’s students are to earn degrees worth the
parchment on which they are printed, European
governments will sooner or later have to introduce
tuition fees. These should be backed by strong systems
of maintenance grants to ensure that access is open to
all and that students can afford to sustain three or four
years of study.
The UK has started the process and Germany is moving
in the same direction. The political challenge to the
status quo in France will be enormous. As many British
and American universities can testify, increasing numbers
of the best young French people are already voting with
their feet, seeking an international education beyond the
stultifying constraints of the ancient regime at home.
Third, European countries are going to have to become
much more selective in the way they allocate resources.
There are nearly 2,000 universities in the EU, most of
which aspire to conduct research and offer postgraduate
degrees. By contrast, fewer than 250 US universities
award postgraduate degrees and fewer than 100 are
recognised as research-intensive.
Given this concentration of resources, it is no wonder
the United States dominates the league tables of 
the world's best research universities. Europe needs to
devote its available research budget – at national 
and EU level – on the basis of peer-reviewed 
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Knowledge is an increasingly critical factor in shaping economic
life – but across Europe, the institutions that should be the main
sources of knowledge are failing to meet the challenge. Guest
contributor Nick Butler outlines what must be done to improve
the quality of higher education in the European Union.
Europe’s universities – 
time for reform
in brief...
excellence. Research funding should not be a cover for
regional policy. 
Selectivity is also important when it comes to accepting
students. World-class universities have to be free to pick
their own talent rather than to take what comes – as
happens now in large parts of Europe. Without some test
of merit and potential, universities will remain simply a
device for disguising unemployment numbers, as is the
case in parts of southern Europe.
The fourth area concerns the curriculum reform. This is
already under way in more than 40 countries across the
continent, through what is known as the Bologna process.
The idea is to establish easily recognisable and comparable
degrees based around a two-cycle system of studies,
starting with a bachelor degree and moving on to a
masters. The UK, with its own traditions, has barely
embraced the process, but change is coming and more
British universities need to engage and to experiment in
this area.
Fifth, Europe needs to develop a much more diverse
system of higher education. Rather than attempting to
make them all equal, the aim should be to create a rich
mix of institutions – some offering world-class teaching
and research, others concentrating on regional or local
needs. Germany recognises this challenge with its plans to
fund a small group of elite institutions, as do the best of
the new generation of universities in the UK, which are
developing their own specialisms and breaking free of the
need to mimic Oxbridge.
Finally, in pursuing this agenda of excellence through
diversity, a creative mix of funding is necessary – to reward
talent, research and teaching; to stimulate entrepreneurial
development; to encourage experimentation; and to
enable universities to reach out to meet the rapidly
growing global need for education. Much of this funding
will come from government, but universities also need to
develop their own funding streams, and to see themselves
as self-standing institutions.
Diversity will be one of the principal benefits of a break
from the nationalised past. As freestanding organisations,
universities will be able to find their own distinctive
capabilities. 
Universities may seem slow to change, but history
suggests that over time they do reflect the needs of the
societies of which they are part. Change in higher
education must be part of a much wider reform of the
entire education system – providing ladders of
opportunities; developing talents concealed by poor family
backgrounds and language difficulties; and offering
second and third chances for men and women to revisit
the process of education through their lives.
Universities are part of that wider process and vital to its
success. Their development and their capacity to respond
to the challenges facing Europe will be a crucial leading
indicator of the EU’s success in the fiercely competitive
environment of the twenty-first century global economy.
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Nick Butler is Director of the Cambridge
Centre for Energy Studies. He is co-author with
Richard Lambert (a member of CEP’s policy
committee) of The Future of European
Universities – Renaissance or Decay, published
by the Centre for European Reform in 2006.
Europe needs a much
more diverse system of
higher education with a
creative mix of funding
Throughout Europe, there
is a powerful case 
for universities to be 
more independent
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he exploits of David
Brent in the television
series The Office have
made bad British
management practices
infamous around the
globe. But these failings have a far longer
historical pedigree. The Harvard business
historians Alfred Chandler and David
Landes have both claimed that poor
management practices held back British
companies. In 1947 as part of the
Marshall Aid scheme to revive post-war
Europe, American businessmen and
engineers concluded that ‘efficient
management was the most significant
factor in the American advantage’.
But how do British firms now compare
in terms of management practices, not
only with the United States and
continental Europe but also with the rising
industrial giants of India and China? Until
recently economists have had little to say
about the role of management in driving
productivity and other key performance
indicators. This is largely because there has
been an absence of good quality data on
management practices. Working in
partnership with McKinsey & Company,
CEP has been carrying out a large research
project that attempts to fill this void.
We have developed an original survey
method to measure management practices
in a systematic way in more than 4,000
firms in Europe, the United States and
Asia. By combining these data with firm
accounts and industrial statistics, we are
able to explore in detail the relationship
between management practices, the
economic environment and company
performance.
Overall, we find compelling evidence
that better management practices are
significantly associated with higher
productivity and other indicators of
corporate performance, including return
on capital employed, sales per employee,
sales growth and survival. This is true in
every country we look at, suggesting that
our characterisation of good management
practice is not culturally biased towards
‘Anglo-Saxon’ approaches. 
We estimate that management
practices can account for up to a third of
the differences in productivity between
firms and countries. Why are there such
startling differences in the management
practices and productivity of competing
companies? Our research offers some
potential explanations for these
differences and suggests areas where
policy can encourage the spread of good
management practices.
Measuring management
practices
Measuring management requires us to
codify the concept of good and bad
CentrePiece Autumn 2007
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What drives good m
around the world?
It has long been suspected that bad
management plays a key role in explaining the
UK’s productivity gap with the United States
and some of our European neighbours. CEP’s
global survey of over 4,000 firms suggests that
there is indeed a ‘management gap’ – and
reveals the forces driving variations in the
quality of management practices.
So you think
manufacturing 
is boring...
During the summer of 2006, we
interviewed over 4,000 managers. Some of
these individuals were extremely colourful
characters, providing endless entertainment
to the research team with their comments
immortalised on our team quotes board.
Some of our favourites included:
Talent rewards 
the Indian way
Interviewer:
How do you identify your 
star performers?
Indian plant manager:
This is India. Everyone thinks 
he is a star performer.
management into a measure applicable to
different firms. We used an interview-
based management practice evaluation
tool that defines and scores from 1 (worst
practice) to 5 (best practice) across 18 of
the key management practices that appear
to matter to industrial firms, based on
McKinsey’s expertise in working with
thousands of companies across several
decades. The 18 practices fall into four
broad areas:
■ Shopfloor operations: have companies
adopted both the letter and the spirit of
lean manufacturing?
■ Performance monitoring: how well do
companies track what goes on inside
their firms?
■ Target setting: do companies set the
right targets, track the right outcomes
and take appropriate action if the two
don’t tally?
■ Incentive setting: are companies hiring,
developing and keeping the right
people and providing them with
incentives to succeed?
For each company in the study,
researchers interviewed by telephone one
or two senior plant-level managers, who
knew only that they were taking part in a
‘research’ project. These managers were
selected because they are senior enough
to have a reasonable perspective on what
happens in a company but not so senior
that they might be out of touch with the
shopfloor. The interviews relied on open
questions and the interviewers were
trained to probe for details of practices on
the ground.
The interviews were run by an
international team of 47 postgraduate
students (mainly MBAs), who worked from
CEP in a specially created survey centre
management 
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Figure 1:
US firms are the best managed, followed by the Germans and
Swedes, with the Greeks, Indians and Chinese the worst
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Poland
France
UK
Italy
Japan
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Germany
United States
The bars indicate for each country the average score on the 
18 management questions (1=worst practice, 5=best practice).
The British chat-up
Male production manager: 
Your accent is really cute and 
I love the way you talk. 
Do you fancy meeting up near
the factory for some fun?
Female (Australian) interviewer: 
That’s a great offer – how 
could I refuse? Unfortunately,
I’m washing my hair every night
for the next three months.
Strong competition
and flexible labour
markets both lead
directly to improved
management
performance
during the summer of 2006. This was a
24-hour operation since the Chinese day
starts at midnight in London, just before
managers on the West Coast of the United
States pack up to go home.
Management practices
around the world
As Figure 1 shows, there are significant
differences in management performance
across countries. The United States is at the
top of the management league table,
while Greece, India and China are the
worst performers. Germany, Sweden and
Japan are (not surprisingly) strong
performers given the manufacturing focus
of the survey, while France, Italy and the
UK are all solidly mid-table.
But the United States is not entirely
dominant. US firms score particularly highly
for people management, such as
promoting and rewarding talented workers
quickly. But as Figure 2 shows, in shopfloor
operations management, Sweden, France,
Italy, Japan and Germany do relatively
better. 
Overall, cross-country differences
account for only 9% of the variation in
management practice. Performance
differences between companies in the
same country are far larger than any cross-
country variation. For example, the best
third of Indian companies outperform the
European average. This is worrying for
those who complacently assume that vastly
superior Western management protects
them from offshoring.
Managers are very poor at
self-assessment
Since good management is strongly linked
with good performance, why do so many
firms fail to make a priority of improving
their practices? The techniques are pretty
well known yet many firms remain poorly
managed. 
To examine possible causes of this
disconnect, we asked managers as a final
question in the interview to assess the
overall management performance of their
firm on a scale of 1 to10. To avoid false
modesty, they were asked to exclude their
personal performance from the calculation.
As Figure 3 indicates, interviewees’
answers to this question are not well
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Figure 2:
European firms are relatively better at operations
management than people management
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The bars indicate for each country the average score on six questions
focused on operations management minus the average score on six
questions focused on people management.
Americans on
geography
Interviewer: 
How many production sites do
you have abroad?
Manager in Indiana: 
Ummmm… well… we have 
one in Texas…
Multinationals tend to achieve
excellent management practices
wherever they are located
correlated with either our management
practice score or their own business
performance. At the country level, we find
Greek, Portuguese and Indian managers to
be the most over-optimistic about their
management practices, while the
Japanese, Swedish and French managers
are the most pessimistic.
Government policy plays an
important role
A variety of policy factors have an effect on
companies’ adoption of good management
practices. Most significant among these are
their competitive environment and the
flexibility of the local labour market.
When competition (whether measured
by narrow industry profit margins, trade
openness or number of rivals) is higher,
management is better. This could be a
result of two effects: first, good practice
spreads quickly in highly competitive
environments; and second, poor practice is
eliminated by Darwinian natural selection as
poorer performing companies are removed
from the marketplace.
We also find that flexible labour
markets matter, since these appear to allow
companies to adopt better people
management practices. In countries with
rigid employment laws (using the World
Bank’s index), firms find it difficult to
implement effective hiring, promotion,
retention and firing practices.
The high position of the United 
States in the management league table is
helped by its competitive product markets
and flexible labour markets.
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Figure 3:
Managers are over-optimistic about their own management
practices across the globe
■ Self-assessed management score
■ Our management score
The difficulties of defining 
ownership in Europe 
Production manager:
We’re owned by the Mafia.
Interviewer: 
I think that’s the ‘Other’ category… although I guess I
could put you down as an ‘Italian multinational’.
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The bars indicate for each country the average score on the 18 management
practice questions and the average score on the self-assessed management
question: ‘Excluding yourself, how well managed is your firm on a scale of 1 to 10,
where 1 is worst practice, 10 is best practice and 5 is average’. The scores are
divided by 2 to put them on the same scale as our management scores.
management scores are more likely to be
biased downwards by having recently
purchased badly run firms.
To investigate this we re-plotted the
management scores for only those firms
that have had the same ownership for at
least the last three years and found that
doing this increases the lead of private
equity firms over all other firms, making
them the best managed in the sample.
Multinationals, family
ownership and skills
Firm ownership and the availability of
skilled people, both in management and
among the workforce in general, are also
associated with important differences
between the better-managed firms and
the rest. 
For example, multinational companies
are well managed around the globe,
achieving extremely good management
practices in countries like Greece and India
despite the poor management practices of
local domestic firms. 
Family ownership and the traditional
practice of primogeniture – handing
down the CEO position to the eldest son
– are associated with particularly bad
management practices (see Figure 4). 
This appears to be an issue for Europe
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Private equity, public gain
One particular ownership form that
appears to be linked with superior
management practices is private equity. As
Figure 4 shows, private equity firms are
the best managed. This superior
performance of private equity appears to
be quite robust – they come out on top
both with and without controls for
country and industry. 
One possible explanation is that
private equity firms only buy well-
managed firms so that their high
management scores simply reflect their
ability to cherry-pick the firms that they
buy. But the usual story of private equity
buy-outs is the reverse: they buy badly
managed firms with the aim of turning
them around. This suggests that their
Figure 4:
Management scores are highest for private equity owned firms
■ Management score for all firms
■ Management score for firms that did not change ownership in the past three years
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Private equity
Dispersed shareholders
Family/founder owned but
with an external CEO
Private individuals
Family/founder
owned and CEO
Government
The bars indicate for each type of firm ownership the deviation from
the country and industry average score on the 18 management
practice questions. The scores are for domestic firms only, of which
there are 2,385 in the sample. The red bar for each type of ownership
only includes the 2,180 firms that have had the same ownership for
the past three years. The number of firms for the blue/red bar are as
follows: government (53/53); family/founder owned and CEO
(1,185/1,082); private individuals (364/285); family/founder owned
and external CEO (153/145); dispersed shareholders (624/566); and
private equity (64/37).
Employee 
retention the old-
fashioned way:
Company chairman:
Sex is a great thing! If I can get
my employee a local girlfriend
he’ll never leave.
The best-
managed firms
are those with
three or more
years of
private equity
ownership
Family owned
firms that appoint
the eldest son as
the CEO are
particularly badly
managed
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since in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal
and the UK, around 10% of the
manufacturing firms are family owned
with a CEO that has been chosen
because they are the eldest son. The
United States performs much better on
this dimension, with only 2% of its firms
being family owned with the CEO chosen
because he is the eldest son.
The skills of both the managers and
non-managers in the firm also appear to
play an important role. For example,
84% of managers in the highest scoring
firms are educated to degree level or
higher, as are a quarter of the non-
management work force. Among the
lowest scoring firms, by contrast, only
54% of managers and 5% of the wider
workforce have degrees.
What can the 
government do?
Our research shows a significant
management gap between the UK on the
one hand and the United States and some
European countries on the other. This is a
situation that the government can modify
by encouraging the uptake of good
management practices. 
Our research suggests that strong
competition and flexible labour markets
both lead directly to improved
management performance. Multinational
companies have a strong positive effect
too, and their influence is felt throughout
the countries in which they operate. In
these respects, the British government has
a good track record and it is in other
European countries that these lessons
need to be taken on board. 
The UK performs less well in the areas
of skills and family ownership. British
levels of basic education are low by
international standards, and any policies
that addressed this would have a big
impact. As regards family ownership, there
is currently a distortion in the inheritance
tax system that actually promotes the
continued ownership of privately held
manufacturing firms in family hands,
keeping these out of private equity
ownership.
Our research suggests that by
appointing managers on the basis 
of primogeniture rather than
competitively on the basis of merit, 
we are possibly promoting more bad
management and productivity practices 
in the UK.
More details on this research can be found in
’Management Practice and Productivity: Why
They Matter’ by Nick Bloom, Stephen Dorgan,
John Dowdy, Christos Genakos, Raffaella
Sadun and John Van Reenen, July 2007
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/management/
Management_Practice_and_Productivity.pdf).
For full details of the survey methodology,
including all the questions, see ‘Measuring
and Explaining Management Practices across
Firms and Nations’ by Nick Bloom and 
John Van Reenen, CEP Discussion Paper 
No. 716 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0716.pdf) and forthcoming in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
The research was jointly funded by the
Advanced Institute of Management Research,
the Anglo-German Foundation, the Economic
and Social Research Council and the
Kauffman Foundation.
Nick Bloom is an assistant professor of
economics at Stanford University and a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. Christos Genakos, a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme, is at Cambridge
University. Raffaella Sadun is a CEP
research economist. John Van Reenen is
director of CEP.
The things we 
did to get 
interviews
French secretary:
You want to talk to the plant
manager? There are legal
proceedings against him, 
so hurry up.
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Ozonomics
in brief...
The most popular misconception in economics and politics
is that if the economy is humming along, the government
must be doing a good job – it must be a capable
economic manager and its policies must be working.
When the economy is booming, politicians encourage the
public to believe that they tightly control the economy.
The idea that they hold the fortune of the nation in the
palm of their hands appeals to them, and they want the
public to take the strong economy as evidence of their
skill and omnipotence.
The media too are susceptible to this fiction because 
we like to have someone to blame for our hardships 
and praise for our success – heroes and villains make 
good stories.
The truth, however, is that politicians have much less
control over the economy than they would have us
believe. Certainly, there can be policy successes and 
policy failures, but more often than not the condition of
the economy is determined by factors outside the control
of politicians.
The economy is much like a little boat in a wide sea.
Whether the trip is calm or rocky depends much more on
the weather and the wash from the bigger boats than
anything that might be done internally. If the weather is
bad, you cannot blame the skipper for the bumpy ride. In
fact, unless you know a lot about sailing, it’s hard to know
whether the skipper is doing a good job in bad
circumstances or whether he’s making it worse.
The same is true of skippering the economy. If you ask
people about the state of their economy in the last five
years of the global boom, they will remember the low
unemployment rates, the low inflation, the low interest
rates and the general mood of affluence that suffused the
world. Incumbent leaders have generally turned this
prosperity into stunning electoral success.
But most people are much sketchier on the following
question: ‘Which of our leader’s policies, if any, can
actually be shown to have produced the boom for which
he has received so much credit?’ This question is critical to
the issue of whether a government’s leadership is
responsible for the prosperity it presided over – or
whether that prosperity was produced by the policies of
previous governments or the influence of benign
international economic forces.
In Australia, the incumbent conservative government has
benefited from an extraordinary period of prosperity, one
that makes even the recent success of the British economy
look modest by comparison. Australia has had 16 years of
continuous expansion during which its wealth has
doubled, labour productivity increased by a half and jobs
increased by a quarter so that unemployment is at a 33-
year low of 4.3%. 
Australians have generally chosen not to think too hard
about where this prosperity has come from. They have
richly rewarded Prime Minister John Howard at the ballot
box without looking too closely at causes and effects.
But a more accurate analysis of different governments’
contribution to Australia’s ‘miracle’ economy involves
recognising that economic policies act with a lag, so 
the prosperity reaped today may have been sown many
years before.
In Australia the battle for the title of ‘better economic
Australia’s extraordinary period of prosperity has allowed
the incumbent government to position themselves as
economic superheroes. But as Andrew Charlton warns in
a new book, we should always adopt a sceptical attitude to
any politician’s claims about their contribution to national
economic success.
Letting politicians take credit for a
booming economy distorts the public
debate about economic policy
manager’ has become one of competing narratives.
Howard and his finance minister Peter Costello, backlit by
the conspicuous boom, have an obvious advantage over
the Labor Party’s story, which is unflatteringly silhouetted
against the recession they presided over.
Labor says its macroeconomic framework in the 1980s
and microeconomic reform in the 1990s created the
bedrock for later success and that the recession was the
price to be paid for progress.
In contrast, the conservatives say the Howard
government’s decisions to pay down the national debt
and deliver budget surpluses have directly produced the
long boom. Howard has taken credit for the prosperity
and used it to position himself as an economic superhero
deserving of complete trust from the electorate.
Every government’s claims about the economy deserve
thorough scrutiny because what we believe about the
foundation of our wealth makes a great deal of
difference to how we should pursue our future. If, as
our leaders would have us believe, the prosperity of
Britain and Australia has been due to the superior
performance of our leaders, then our job as
citizens is merely to continue passively to re-elect
those leaders.
But if our success is a complex combination
of long-term policies and global
circumstances, then our challenge is to
ensure we continue constant public debate
with a view to finding the right policies to
sustain our position in a changing world.
Letting politicians take credit for a booming
economy that is not of their making distorts the
public debate about economic policy.
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Andrew Charlton is a research economist
in CEP’s globalisation programme. His new
book Ozonomics: Inside the Myth of
Australia’s Economic Superheroes has just
been published by Random House.
Economic success is a
complex combination of
long-term policies and
global circumstances
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Union blues
in brief...
Trade unions are in the doldrums. Although the rate of
decline in union membership has slowed since Labour
came to power in 1997, the latest figures show that they
continued to lose members in 2006. The reasons are clear.
Unions are less able to organise new workplaces and new
workers than they used to be. As a consequence, an
increasing proportion of all workers have never been
union members, and new workplaces rarely recognise
unions for pay bargaining.
Less well known is the effect that the loss of membership
is having on unions as organisations. These effects are
identified for the first time in our research, which
measures the resources available to unions both on their
own balance sheets and within establishments.
As Figure 1 suggests, the finances of British unions are in
a parlous state. This is not particularly surprising since they
rely very heavily on members’ subscriptions as their
primary source of income. Thus, their income flows fall as
membership falls unless they can increase membership
fees substantially or generate income from other sources.
Moreover, expenditure has exceeded subscription income
for some time. Of course, this is not a sustainable strategy
in the long run and it has implications for their ability to
sustain assets.
Few unions like to raise membership fees. It’s generally
viewed as impractical and unacceptable. Most unions
allow their annual conferences to debate a higher fee but,
not surprisingly, there is rarely an appetite for it so it
doesn’t happen. Yet unions elsewhere in the world have
adopted this approach. For example, the Health Services
Union of Australia recently decided to increase their
subscriptions dramatically, arguing that the quality of their
services, including collective bargaining, requires them to
be on a stable and viable financial footing.
In countries like the United States, members are used to
paying a much higher percentage of their wages in union
fees: in return, they get the largest union wage premium
in the world. Some unions in Britain are studying this issue
carefully and are considering running experiments to test
the sensitivity of demand for membership to the price of
joining – whether and by how much numbers might fall if
fees were higher.
Meanwhile, the chief response of unions to the
diminishing pool of unionised labour has been to engage
in what we call ‘market share unionism’, in which they
have sought to grab a greater share of the remaining
union pie. It is this strategy that lies behind the wave of
union mergers we’ve witnessed in Britain in recent years.
The membership of Britain’s trade unions continues to
decline and, despite a series of mergers, most of them face
severe financial difficulties. Alex Bryson and Paul
Willman examine their organisational failings and find a
glimmer of hope in the handful of success stories – unions
representing professional workers.
Figure 1:
Changes in union resources 1984-2004 
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Each of the four indices is set at
100 in 1990. The Offbal (‘off-
balance sheet resources’) index
is constructed using the
Workplace Employment
Relations Surveys, from which a
workplace can be rated between
0 and 3, scoring 1 each time it
has one of the following: check-
off; management recommenda-
tion of union membership or a
closed shop; and an on-site
union representative. The other
three indices are derived from
Certification Officer returns.
Solvency is the margin of total
income over total expenditure.
Reserves are total funds divided
by expenditure.
The most successful unions
organise occupations rather than
industries or workplaces
Between 1990 and 2005, the number of unions fell by
over 40%. In 2007, there have been further reductions
and greater membership concentration following the
merger between AMICUS and the Transport and General
Workers Union.
The rationale for such mergers is analogous to the
rationale for corporate mergers and acquisitions: unions try
to consolidate their resources, creating a more substantial
organisation that, at least in theory, is capable of grabbing
a bigger share of existing members and, if they are lucky,
attracting new members through greater ‘reach’.
At the same time, the logic goes, unions can reduce their
cost base by stripping out duplicate union services
(offices, officials and the like). In practice, it hasn’t really
worked out like this. By definition, the big unions each
have a greater share of union membership than they did
when they operated separately. But there is no evidence
that they have succeeded in expanding membership
beyond their traditional base.
What’s more, they have not been cutting costs so as to
take advantage of the economies of scale that mergers
offer. This is partly because, despite mergers, these
unions rarely operate as general unions. Instead, they
continue to operate along sectoral, industrial or
occupational lines, often because unions recognise 
that different types of members require different types 
of service.
This organisational knowledge is often locked away in
particular sections of unions used to servicing parts of the
unions’ membership. If unions are to reap returns to
scale, they’ll have to work out how to share this
knowledge around the organisation and create efficient
structures that permit them to service their members with
fewer staff and offices.
What does all of this mean for unions in the future? 
First, it is doubtful whether unions will be able to service
their existing members without greater reliance on the
voluntary endeavours of lay union activists and their
broader membership. This is what we call their ‘off-
balance sheet resources’. Alas, our research shows that
these resources are also in decline.
Second, unions’ organising capability is severely damaged.
When finances are tight, unions are less likely to risk
spending money organising in new workplaces unless 
they can be fairly sure of success. More generally, they
simply do not have the organisational capacity on the
ground to reach out to new workers and bring them into
the union movement.
But it would be wrong to conclude that all is doom and
gloom. Although the general picture looks bleak, there are
huge differences in the finances of different unions and
there are some real success stories.
What’s more, success depends, at least in part, on the
business models that unions are deploying. The most
successful unions, both in membership terms and
financially, are those representing professional workers, in
particular, those representing doctors (the British Medical
Association), nurses (the Royal College of Nurses) and
teachers (the National Union of Teachers).
These unions continue to organise occupations, rather
than industries or workplaces, because union membership
remains strongly linked to occupational identity. As well as
representing their members in pay and conditions
negotiations, grievance procedures and the like, these
unions also protect their members against clients and
state interference. Other unions would do well to take
note – before it’s too late.
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This article summarises ‘Accounting for Collective Action:
Resource Acquisition and Mobilisation in British Unions’
by Alex Bryson and Paul Willman, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 768 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0768.pdf)
and forthcoming in Advances in Industrial and 
Labor Relations.
Alex Bryson is research director at the Policy Studies
Institute and the Manpower Research Fellow at CEP.
Paul Willman is professor in employment relations and
organisational behaviour at LSE.
The latest figures on union membership are 
in a 2006 DTI/ONS report by Heidi Grainger and Martin
Crowther (http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file39006.pdf).
Unions no longer have the
organisational resources to
reach out to new workers
and new workplaces
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Life on the
Monetary Policy
Committee
Stephen Nickell was the first external
member of the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee to serve two three-year
terms. He reflects on his experiences setting
the nation’s official interest rate.
O
ne Tuesday evening
in the spring of
2000, I received a
phone call from Gus
O’Donnell, the then
permanent secretary
at HM Treasury, suggesting that I might like
to attend a small meeting at the Treasury
on the following day. After some
discussion, he revealed that it concerned a
job but refused to be more specific.
On the Wednesday morning, I went
into the Treasury where he and Ed Balls
asked if I wished to become a member of
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC). On the Wednesday and
Thursday, I organised leave from the LSE
for four days per week and had a chat
with Eddie George, then the Bank’s
governor. Gordon Brown announced my
appointment on the Friday morning.
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Such speedy appointments to public
bodies are relatively unusual but members
of the MPC have always been, and still
are, appointed with great rapidity and
secrecy, much to the irritation of the
House of Commons Treasury Committee.
Before starting on the MPC and
having purchased a new suit, the first
exciting event was to appear before the
Treasury Committee for my confirmation
hearing. This involved first, completing a
lengthy ‘exam’ paper on various aspects of
monetary policy-making (which was set, as
it happens, by Charlie Bean, then an
adviser to the committee and a fellow LSE
professor, and from later that year the
Bank’s chief economist); and second, a
grilling by the committee in the presence
of the financial press.
When I made my appearance, I was
the second person on, the first having
been Chris Allsopp who had been
appointed at the same time. Chris was
given such a hostile reception by the
committee (with Brian Sedgemore leading
the charge) that by the time they got to
me, the MPs were merely mildly
aggressive, having run out of steam. 
This proved to be the last time that
prospective MPC members went before
the Treasury Committee for their
confirmation hearings without a long
practice session at the Bank.
The MPC operates on a monthly cycle,
essentially because, by law, it must meet
to set interest rates in every calendar
month. The interest rate decision is made
on the first or second Thursday of each
month. On the previous Friday morning,
the committee meets to listen to the Bank
staff going through the economic news.
The following week, the committee
spends the Wednesday afternoon
discussing the current and future
prospective state of the economy and the
Thursday morning making the interest rate
decision, which is announced at noon.
These discussions form the basis of the
minutes that are put together by a
secretariat of four Bank staff who are
present throughout. These minutes are
discussed at length and amended by 
the entire committee on the Monday,
eleven days after decision day and are
published, along with details of the vote,
two days later.
One of the key features of this process
is the fact that the decision on interest
rates is taken by strict majority vote. On
the Thursday morning, the governor
invites each member of the committee to
present their vote on rates along with
their reasons, each member being
expected to talk for about ten minutes.
The deputy governor in charge of
monetary analysis (currently Rachel Lomax)
is always invited to go first, the next seven
members are then asked in apparently
random order and the governor always
goes last.
Of the nine members, five are
internals who are permanent Bank
employees: the governor, two deputies,
the chief economist and the head of
markets. The other four are external
members appointed in the same fashion
as myself. On one occasion, I was present
at an exceptionally unusual event. The
random order of speaking by the seven
members between Rachel Lomax and the
governor just happened to be in anti-
clockwise order around the table. If the
order were truly random at each meeting,
this event would only be observed, on
average, once every 438 years.
Extensive study of the voting records
of the committee has failed to elucidate
any patterns. There is no block voting, and
within both internal and external groups
there are often divisions with deputy
governors voting against the governor, for
example. Indeed the committee is not
concerned with consensus, split votes are
common and the governor has twice been
on the losing side. Note that since
governors always vote last, they can
choose whether to join the winning or
losing side except in the unusual
circumstance when they have the casting
vote, with the previous eight members’
votes tied at 4-4.
The style of decision-making, using
strict majority voting based on the
individual views of nine independent MPC
members, is reinforced by the fact that
members are held to account for their
individual votes. Formally, they are
questioned in public by the Treasury
Committee, where they must appear three
or four times a year. Furthermore,
individual members frequently use
speeches, papers and interviews to justify
their particular positions.
In my view, this method of decision-
making – that is, nine individuals coming
to their own decisions and then using
majority voting to aggregate them –
generates outcomes that are superior to
methods based on a search for a
consensus under the auspices of a
dominant leader favoured by some central
banks.
The desirability of having independent
voices on the committee suggests that
while professional economists should have
a strong representation, it is a good idea
to have a number of members with a
different point of view. This helps to
ensure that decision-making is not
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dominated by a rigid consensus
perspective. Indeed to guard further
against this, during my time the
committee often used to invite members
to prepare short papers focusing on
factors that might lead to decisions being
seriously mistaken.
Of course, aside from the actual
procedures involved with the monthly
round of decision-making, there is a great
deal of background activity. Within the
Bank, all the external members engage in
research and analysis, each assisted by two
Bank researchers. This results in numerous
speeches, press interviews and papers
prepared for consumption by academics,
financial journalists and the general public.
An important part of the job is to
ensure that individual views and
committee decisions are explained to the
world at large as clearly as possible. To
help with this, the MPC publishes a
forecast every three months explaining its
view of where the UK economy is going
over the next three years. The production
of these forecasts involves numerous
meetings of the committee, interacting
extensively with large numbers of the
Bank staff. The monetary analysis division
of the Bank contains around 120
economists, which reveals the sheer scale
of the whole monetary policy operation.
On top of this, it is part of the remit of
MPC members to go on regional visits. So
about ten times a year, I would set off for
some distant part of the UK both to listen
and to explain. These visits usually lasted
two days and involved a great deal of
eating. The basic format was to meet
large groups of business people, 
trade unionists, academics and so on,
over, successively, lunch, dinner, 
breakfast, lunch.
The idea was to give a brief talk about
the economic situation and then engage
in discussions, sometimes heated, about
how things looked from the individual
perspectives of the people present. These
were organised by the Bank’s regional
agents, who had numerous business and
other contacts, and often involved the
local CBI (Confederation of British
Industry), Chamber of Commerce and
similar organisations.
The two most popular topics under
discussion concerned either the dire
consequences of official regulation for
business or what was going to happen
when manufacturing industry disappeared
entirely. Monetary policy rarely seemed to
be a cause for concern. 
Between meals, I would visit local
workplaces, talk to the local press and
give interviews on local radio. The purpose
of all this was partly to get a feel for the
state of the economy on the ground and
partly to fly the flag and explain what the
committee was up to.
By and large, these visits were great
fun. I got to visit places as far afield as the
Isle of Lewis and the Isles of Scilly, as well
as less exotic places like Aberdeen,
Enniskillen, Pwllheli, Truro and Wakefield,
plus all the major cities of the UK. I got to
see the making of steel, aluminium, glass,
brake linings, sandwiches, Smarties,
Formula One cars and stair-lifts, went
down the deepest mine in the UK (a
potash mine in Cleveland), wandered
around call centres, docks, farms, battery
hen sheds, garden centres and shopping
centres, and only failed to get to an oil rig
because the health and safety procedures
would have taken too long.
Overall, the hospitality was splendid,
especially in Northern Ireland. The Omagh
Chamber of Commerce annual dinner was
particularly memorable: arriving at 7pm
for pre-dinner drinks, sitting down to
dinner at 9.30pm, standing up to speak
on monetary policy at around midnight,
and finally taking my leave of an event still
in full cry well after 3am.
During my entire time on the
committee, any time I appeared at a
public event or conference, whatever the
subject and wherever the place, journalists
from the wire services were always there.
Their job was to obtain a quote. These
characters became a part of my life –
indeed one of them followed me around,
at the Bank’s invitation, for an entire two-
day regional visit to North Wales.
So I became famous in a rather
limited, ex officio sense. Then on 1 June
2006, I became an ex-member of the MPC
and I have never seen any of them again.
It was great fun while it lasted.
The MPC decision-making 
method generates superior
outcomes to methods based on a
search for a consensus under the
auspices of a dominant leader
UK monetary
policy is decided 
by strict majority
voting based 
on committee
members’
individual views
Stephen Nickell is Warden of Nuffield
College, Oxford and a longstanding
participant in CEP’s research programme
on labour markets.
Regulators have capped the charges that
mobile operators can levy on other networks
for connecting calls to their subscribers. But as
new research by Christos Genakos and
Tommaso Valletti shows, this leads to a
‘waterbed’ effect, where prices rise elsewhere.
Their analysis has implications for recent 
EU caps on ‘roaming charges’.
T
he prices that mobile
operators charge other
network operators
(fixed or mobile) for
connecting calls to
their subscribers – so-
called termination charges – have become
a hotly debated issue among regulators
and academics worldwide. The level of
these charges is perceived to be high 
both in absolute terms, but also in 
relation to similar prices charged by fixed
network operators.
Industry analysts argue that such
charges may inhibit the future growth of
telecoms services. What’s more, especially
for fixed-to-mobile termination rates, a
large body of theoretical research in
economics has demonstrated that
independently of the intensity of
competition for mobile customers, mobile
operators have an incentive to set charges
that will extract the largest possible
surplus from fixed users.
This problem has provided the
justification for regulatory intervention to
cut termination rates. But reducing the
level of charges can potentially increase the
level of prices for mobile subscribers. This
is what is known as the ‘waterbed’ effect,
where pressing down prices in one part of
firms’ operations causes another set of
prices to rise. Understanding and
quantifying the effect – as our research
aims to do – is critical for assessing
consumer benefits from mobile termination
regulation.
Regulating termination
charges
Mobile termination charges have been an
important issue ever since 1997 when the
first regulatory debate started in the UK.
Price controls on the two largest operators
were put into effect from 1998 to
2002, requiring termination
charges to be reduced by 9% per year in
real terms.
After a lengthy consultation and
investigation, the UK telecoms regulator
(then called Oftel) concluded at the end of
2001 that mobile termination charges were
still substantially in excess of cost. It
proposed additional price controls for the
next four years on the four major mobile
companies, Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-
Mobile. The companies objected and the
matter was referred to the Competition
Commission.
The Commission broadly endorsed
Oftel’s proposals. It concluded that
competition in the mobile industry did not
constrain fixed-to-mobile termination
charges and that a price
cap was the only remedy
Regulating the mobile phone industry:
beware the
‘waterbed’ effect
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likely to address these detriments
effectively. The Commission considered
that this would yield significant benefits
without an increase in average retail prices
or a significant loss of retail subscribers. In
fact, it was during these investigations
that the term waterbed was first coined by
the late Paul Geroski, chairman of the
Competition Commission.
Other countries have followed the
UK’s lead. The European Commission
introduced a new regulatory framework
for electronic communications in 2002.
Every member state of what was then the
EU-15 was obliged to conduct a market
analysis of the mobile termination market
and, to the extent that market failures
were found, remedies would have to be
introduced. Indeed, all the countries that
completed the analysis did find problems
and imposed (differential) cuts to
termination rates.
In 2005, the New Zealand Commerce
Commission introduced similar regulation
and while it was convinced that the
waterbed effect is a theoretically general
phenomenon, it doubted its empirical
importance. Similarly, the most recent
termination rate proposals by Ofcom
(Oftel’s successor organisation)
acknowledge the importance of the
waterbed effect, but question whether the
effect is ‘complete’, arguing that this can
only be the case if the retail market is
sufficiently competitive.
Analysing the waterbed effect
Mobile operators compete in the
marketplace to win subscribers, who then
provide a stream of revenues. They
compete by offering attractive prices for
subscriptions and outbound mobile calls
and also, in the case of monthly
subscribers, subsidised handsets. In doing
so, they consider all the revenues that will
accrue from acquiring a customer
and all the costs of servicing
that customer. Part of their revenues 
are the charges that they receive from
other networks for connecting calls to
their subscribers.
When considering its pricing policy, a
mobile operator will take these
termination revenues into account. The
higher these revenues, the lower the total
price an operator would charge its
customers. It makes sense for any mobile
operator to pass-through some of its
revenue to consumers, because by
lowering prices, it increases the number of
mobile subscribers, which in turn increases
the termination revenues earned.
Of course, the reverse is also true: if
regulation reduces termination charges
and hence revenues, operators will have to
raise their prices to subscribers. To assess
how widespread this waterbed effect
might be, we need to analyse how it can
emerge under different market scenarios.
If the mobile market were
characterised by very strong (perfect)
competition, then operators would expect
to make zero excess economic profits.
Consider now what would happen as a
result of an increase in termination
charges. This would increase the revenues
associated with each new customer, hence
increasing their value to mobile operators.
Mobile operators would start competing
by lowering their prices to acquire these
new customers.
The result of competition would be a
complete waterbed effect: any additional
profit would be simply passed on to
consumers via lower prices, so that
economic profits remain zero. Under this
market structure, the introduction of
regulation to cut fixed-to-mobile
termination charges would affect the
structure of prices but not the overall
profitability of operators. 
While competition appears to be
strong in the mobile industry, both
regulators and market analysts agree that
operators possess a significant amount of
market power. Hence, there is also a need
to consider the nature of the waterbed
effect when competition is not perfect.
Consider the extreme case of a
monopolist. Economic theory suggests that
a firm with full market power maximises
profits by setting the price at the point
where marginal revenue equals marginal
cost. In other words, the price is such that
the extra revenue the monopolist earns
from selling his last unit is equal to his
extra cost of producing this unit.
Consider again the effect of an
increase in termination charges. Assuming
for simplicity that each subscriber
generates the same amount of termination
revenue, this would increase the revenue
earned on each consumer. As a result, the
monopolist would now charge a lower
price to attract more customers, again
causing the waterbed effect.
Notice that the waterbed effect would
not be complete now, as the firm would
pass-through as lower prices only part of
the extra revenue. Hence, even in the
extreme scenario of a firm possessing
complete market power, a reduction in
termination charges is expected to cause
lower marginal revenues that would
increase optimal subscription prices.
In practice, mobile markets worldwide
are dominated by a small number of firms.
Competition among them is expected to
be somewhere between the two extreme
scenarios of perfect competition and
monopoly. Under these more general
(oligopolistic) market conditions, the same
economic logic applies.
The size of 
the waterbed 
effect is key to
understanding the
costs and benefits
of termination
charges regulation
The magnitude of the waterbed effect
will depend on the intensity of
competition as well as the shapes of the
demand and cost functions underlying the
mobile industry. The previous two extreme
market structures provide us with the
bounds within which we expect the
waterbed effect to lie.
Measuring the waterbed
effect in the mobile 
phone industry
Despite the importance of the waterbed
effect and the wide range of market
conditions under which it arises, until
now, there has been no systematic
evidence to back up the theory. The main
purpose of our research is to examine the
existence and magnitude of the waterbed
effect in the mobile phone industry. Using
a new dataset of mobile operators across
more than 20 countries during the last
decade, we analyse the impact of fixed-to-
mobile termination rate regulation on
prices and profit margins.
Both the timing of the introduction of
regulated termination rates and the
severity with which they were imposed
across mobile operators in practice varied
widely, driven by legal and institutional
characteristics of each country. This
variability allows us to identify and
quantify the waterbed effect for the first
time by looking at the impact of
regulation on prices (and profits) in
reforming countries compared with the
general evolution of prices (and profits) in
non-reforming countries. 
Figure 1 plots the average retail price
for mobile phone usage in countries that
have experienced a change in regulation,
six quarters before and after the
introduction of regulation. Notice first that
compared with prices in the rest of the
world, average prices in countries that
experienced a change in regulation were
actually lower before the introduction
of regulation. This is important
because it refutes the argument that
regulation was introduced as a result of
high retail prices for making mobile calls.
Most importantly, in line with our
waterbed prediction, the introduction of
regulation has a clear positive impact on
prices that becomes stronger as regulation
becomes progressively more binding. 
The full empirical analysis allows us to
control both for common global trends
and for any country and operator
characteristics that remain constant over
time and may influence both regulation
and prices. Our estimates suggest that
although regulation reduced termination
rates by about 10%, this also led to a
more than 10% increase in mobile
outgoing prices on average.
But although the waterbed effect is
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Figure 1:
Average mobile phone usage price around the introduction of
regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges
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large, our analysis also provides evidence
that it is not complete: accounting
measures of profits are positively related to
termination rates, thus mobile firms suffer
from cuts in those rates as they possess
some degree of market power. 
Conclusions
The existence and magnitude of the
waterbed effect following the regulation of
termination rates is key to understanding
the social costs and benefits of the
regulation. Regulators have generally
accepted that the waterbed effect is likely
under perfect competition, but they had
doubts about its validity and empirical
significance under conditions of imperfect
competition. Our research shows that the
waterbed effect exists under a wider range
of possible conditions and is both
significant and strong in practice.
These results have important
implications for the mobile industry, but
also for other ‘two-sided’ markets’ –
industries like shopping malls, credit cards
and dating agencies, where firms need to
attract two (or more) groups of customers
if they are to succeed.
■ First, it implies that any analysis of the
costs and benefits of regulation of
termination rates cannot ignore the
presence of the waterbed effect. The
impact of regulation on (unregulated)
prices for mobile subscribers should be
taken into account when assessing the
overall costs and benefits of regulation. 
■ Second, the mobile phone industry
exhibits features typical of two-sided
markets. The market for subscription
and outgoing services is closely
interlinked to the market for termination
of incoming calls. As in any other two-
sided market the structure of prices
(who pays for what) is fundamentally
important for the development of the
market. Therefore, any regulatory
analysis must take these linkages into
account either at the stage of market
definition or market analysis. 
■ Finally, our analysis has implications for
the current debate about regulation of
international ‘roaming charges’ – the
prices customers pay when using their
phones outside their home country.
The European Commission has voted
to cap roaming charges for making and
receiving phone calls within the EU. These
charges account for 5-10% of operators’
revenues globally and a larger proportion
of their profits. The aim is to reduce the
cost of making mobile phone calls while
abroad and hence encourage more
overseas (but within EU) phone use.
A reduction in roaming charges may
cause a similar waterbed phenomenon,
whereby prices of domestic calls may
increase as operators seek to compensate
for their lost revenue elsewhere. Whereas
with fixed-to-mobile termination
regulation, it was fixed users that
essentially subsidised mobile users, in this
case, it would be the mobile subscribers
themselves that would bear the burden, as
calling abroad would be cheaper but
calling at home could become more
expensive.
While the likely magnitude of the
waterbed effect caused by this new
legislation is debatable, our results
demonstrate that regulators have to
acknowledge its existence and carefully
account for it in their calculations of
consumer benefits.
This article summarises ‘Testing the
“Waterbed” Effect in Mobile Telephony’ 
by Christos Genakos and Tommaso Valletti,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 827
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0827.pdf).
Christos Genakos is a lecturer in economics
at Cambridge University and a research
associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. Tommaso Valletti is
a professor of economics at Tanaka Business
School, Imperial College London.
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